 he reason
France and Germany are so important — and vital — in the EU is to a large extent
due to their propensity to disagree on virtually everything.
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| France and Germany are vital to the EU precisely because they disagree
on virtually everything. |
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The alternative
pursuits of "Colbertism" and of a
"social market
economy" are generalizations and can lead to stereotypes.
But they are not without substance.
The two countries' economic philosophies are so far apart that when they can
agree on something — or increasingly anything at all — everybody else in Europe
often finds the compromise acceptable.
(The United Kingdom is a special case, not relevant for this analysis).
With the signing of the Maastricht
treaty, the Germans could reasonably assume that they had won the
intellectual debate over economic strategy and practice in Europe once and for
all.
The eurozone crisis has decided otherwise.
The rift has reappeared and is widening. Seen from Berlin, France (like other
southern countries) is paying for her failure to implement the painful
structural reforms that have transformed Germany from the sick man of Europe
into the continent's powerhouse.
Meanwhile, terms that sound downright horrific to German ears, such as
"industrial policy" and "a new mandate for the ECB," are reappearing in Paris.
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| After
Maastricht, Germans assumed they had won the debate over economic strategy in
Europe. |
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Seen from Paris,
Germany is the prisoner of a selfish orthodoxy that prevents her from accepting
that new problems require new solutions.
That is a narrative that is broadly shared by other eurozone members, leaving
the Germans to feel isolated.
However, from the painful piecemeal solutions that have accompanied the
European response during the last three years, a consensus seems to emerge that
what is needed is "more Europe."
This implies that the euro (and indeed the entire European project) can only
be saved if the move towards "political union" is made.
This is a debate that France and Germany have carefully tried to avoid ever
since the days when De Gaulle launched his war against Europe's supranational
institutions. Are they really ready for it now?
The conventional wisdom tells us that the Germans are instinctive European
federalists, ready to replicate on a continental scale what they have at home.
The French, on the other hand — as we saw on the occasion of the referendum
on the European "constitution" in May 2005 — continue to cherish unimpeded
national sovereignty.
Here again, stereotypes can be misleading. France has moved a long way from
Gaullist dogma, while the Germans have become more reluctant to share
sovereignty (and money).
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| From
piecemeal solutions in the crisis response, a consensus has emerged for "more
Europe." |
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However, important
differences remain. Merkel and Sarkozy seemed to agree that the solution should
be found on a purely intergovernmental basis.
All the power had to be placed in the European Council, with the implication
that the two countries would effectively run the show.
This plan has not worked. The French have realized that, given the power
shift in favor of Germany, joint dominance is an illusion — which explains
Hollande's move.
The Germans, for their part, are understandably uncomfortable with a
situation where everybody else calls on them to exercise "leadership," but
resents what could look like a "German Europe."
That is why many Germans would prefer a system where the ultimate
decision-making responsibility would be based on common, well-legitimized
institutions.
Advocates of this institutional model in Germany are expected to favor this
approach because they believe that these institutions would essentially continue
to sing to a German tune.
They may be surprised. "Common" institutions can develop an operating logic
that can easily make them very different from that of an intergovernmental
system.
The ECB is a case in point. It was designed with the Bundesbank as
its institutional and cultural template.
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| France has realized that, given the power shift to Germany, joint
dominance is an illusion. |
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But driven by
necessity, Mario Draghi has interpreted his mandate in a rather flexible way.
He has done so with a wise political nod from Berlin, but to the horror of
many in the German establishment.
More nods and more horror are likely to come in the near future.
However we define it, political union is not a small thing. It is also very
possible that Europeans will miss the target.
Nevertheless, there is also the possibility that many EU nations (though not
all) will be driven by necessity in that direction. If and when we come to that
point, we will discover that the problem of sovereignty is only the tip of the
iceberg.
Editor's Note: This is part one of a two part analysis. The second
part can be read here.
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