Nota prévia: Medite-se no terrorismo emergente, cada vez mais inesperado e citadino e sem conhecermos ainda os fundamentos das motivações que conduziram a tais actos bárbaros que, paradoxalmente, mataram um número escasso de pessoas, embora tivesse provocado inúmeros feridos e destruído algum património. Seja como for, foi mais uma barreira da percepção da segurança global que foi rompida, esse facto envia uma mensagem terrível para o mundo: o terror compensa e produz ganhos psicológicos aqueles que seguem essa via e promovem esse processo como forma de destruir a coesão das sociedades.
Post-Boston: Keep Calm and Think Clearly (Part
I) |
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By Amy
Zalman | Tuesday, April 23,
2013 |
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The Boston Marathon bombings provide an opportunity for
the United States to consider how to combat extremist ideas more effectively
than it did a decade ago. But this is not the time to let fear and uncertainty
drive us into misguided and — as importantly — ineffective forms of countering
violent extremism.
arning:
Prominent policy makers are already making demands to disinter the discredited
concepts of the Global War on Terror. Options presented range from designating
the bombers enemy combatants to calling for sweeping surveillance of majority
Muslim communities.
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In
cosmopolitan cities such as London and Paris, the Manichean stringency of
extremism in a religious idiom offered young immigrants or otherwise
disenfranchised men something vital. |
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The motivations
that led Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev to set off lethal bombs at the Boston
Marathon last week may not yet be clear. But the characteristics of that event
already tell us a substantial amount about the direction of 21st century
terrorism — and how we might combat it with increasing effectiveness.
Just over a decade ago, the American public was shocked at the postmodern
qualities that Al Qaeda brought to bear on its brand of global jihad. Rather
than a strictly hierarchical organization organized into discrete cells, the
group was a horizontally-structured network of individuals.
Eliminating a leadership figure or any given "node" in the network did not
necessarily mean cutting off the flow of information among members. The ease of
global travel and communications helped keep them connected.
They communicated using state of the art digital media forms, such as email
and chat rooms and, later, websites and online videos. That allowed them to
transcend territorial boundaries and to spread their ideas globally.
Unlike ethnic or nationalist groups committed to a specific ideological
narrative, Al Qaeda offered a sinuous storyline of glory through sacrifice that
local actors could "franchise" and mold to fit local grievances.
In cosmopolitan cities such as London and Paris, the Manichean stringency of
extremism in a religious idiom offered young immigrants or otherwise
disenfranchised men something vital. It gave them a sense of being grounded in a
world that otherwise marginalized them or offered little support.
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It
gave them a sense of being grounded in a world that otherwise marginalized them
or offered little support. |
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In order to combat
this strange new form of global terrorism, the United States attempted a global
war centered largely on armed combat. As the events of last week tragically
demonstrated, the United States did not win.
As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
recognized, "over the long term, the United States cannot capture or
kill its way to victory." That is not an effective strategy for the terrain of
ideas and beliefs on which so much of the battle with violent extremism takes
place.
Even the application of direct military force to terrorism will be enfolded
into the battle of ideas. The U.S. military can kill a combatant, but in his or
her place ideas and feelings that inspire others will take root: vengeance,
pride in a martyred compatriot, inchoate mourning.
We must therefore return to a war of ideas. But it should in no way be the
same war of ideas attempted in response to the attacks of 2001. That war was
envisioned, first by members of the Bush cabinet and then in military doctrine,
as a bipolar battle with a single ideology of "Islamic extremism." Later, it was
rephrased as the more acceptable "extremism" despite the fact that the referent
continued to denote extremist ideas in the name of Islam.
That war of ideas was modeled on the Cold War, when there was more clearly a
bipolar battle between two competing ideologies, American free market democracy
and Soviet communism. These ideologies were embodied in state institutions and
reflected in the concrete daily activities of citizens.
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To
combat this form of global terrorism, the United States attempted a global war
centered largely on armed combat. Last week tragically demonstrated that the
United States did not win. |
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Al Qaeda had no
such coherence, especially as it spun away from Osama bin Laden into derivative
forms. Sometimes it was composed of multiple groupings that included not only
religiously motivated violent ideologues, but also criminals, thugs and other
political groups with specific grievances.
Indeed, the Dagestani jihadist group that has been named as potentially
behind Tamerlan's motivations has publicly
announced that its battle is with Russia and not with the United States.
We will in the coming days and weeks learn more about why Tamerlan Tsarnaev
was already on watch lists that suspected him of having been radicalized. That
is to say, we will learn more about how and where he gained particular ideas
that made terrorism a reasonable choice.
It is crucial to remember that most people do not make that choice, even in
similar circumstances, and that motivations are always multiple. It is already
being recognized that Dzokhar Tsarnaev, Tamerlan's younger brother, did not
develop his motivations via the same path as his brother.
Rather, both young men lived — as we all do — in a world of many ideas that
are porous and contingent on our circumstances and our receptivity. Out of these
ideas, they each structured a narrative that helped them make sense of who they
were and how to make meaning out of the disparate events of their lives and
their communities. Choosing terrorism is choosing a particular narrative. So is
not choosing terrorism.
The second part of this article will be
published tomorrow.
Editor's note: The views expressed in this article
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies or
positions of the National War College or the U.S. Government.
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Etiquetas: Post-Boston: Keep Calm and Think Clearly (Part I)
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